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JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of this court is properly based upon the
transfer of Civil Case No. 85-4313 by the Utah Supreme Court to
this court under Rule 4A of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals
and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1953 as amended).
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the Honorable
Frank G. Noel on June 6, 1988 in favor of Defendants, and from an
Order entered on October 26, 1988 denying Plaintiffs1 Motion for
a New Trial and to Amend the Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Was Plaintiffs1 reference during trial to the defenses of
illegality and mistake sufficient under Rule 15 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure to require that the trial court's ruling denying
Plaintiffs1

Motion to Amend

the Pleadings to Conform to the

Evidence be reversed for abuse of discretion?
2.

Have Plaintiffs sufficiently marshalled the evidence to

require that the trial court's conclusion that there was no fraud
or negligent misrepresentation by Defendants be reversed for abuse
of discretion?
3.

Did the trial judge abuse his discretion by viewing the

property in dispute?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs are appealing the trial court's judgment awarding
damages for Plaintiffs' default in payments to Defendants on a
Promissory Note, and allowing Defendants to foreclose on the Trust
-1-

Deed securing such payments.

The trial court subsequently denied

Plaintiffs1 Motion for a New Trial and to Amend the Pleadings to
Conform to the Evidence.
In March

Plaintiffs have appealed this order.

1979, Defendants Martin

S. and Reva

S. Ovard

purchased two one-acre lots, a "front" lot and a "back" lot, from
Layne Newman.

(Trial Transcript (hereinafter "Tr.") 58, Trial

Exhibits (hereinafter "Ex.") 12-D and 13-D). The transactions were
executed by two separate trust deeds, each covering one acre (Tr.
222).

The two lots were purchased for a total of $58,000, or

$29,000 for each lot or acre, and were closed at separate times
(Tr. 58, 206-07, 215).
The lots were part of a subdivision plan of Mr. Newman
encompassing five one-acre lots just north of 650 East 13800 South,
Draper, Utah (Tr. 58, 61, 206). However, the subdivision plan was
not approved by the City of Draper (Tr. 60). As a consequence, a
variance was applied for and granted by the City of Draper so that
the

Ovard's could build a home on the front lot (Tr. 60-61, Ex.

7-P) .

The Ovard's request was accompanied by a map showing both

lots (Tr. 61, Ex. 6-P) . The Ovard's then built a home on the front
lot, intending to live there (Tr. 64-65).

Before they could move

in, the Ovard's ran into financial trouble and sold the house and
the front lot to a Mr. Nipco (Tr. 66). The Ovards also received
money from Mr. Ovard's parents, Defendants Ben and Helen Ovard, and
put Ben and Helen Ovard's name on the deed to the back acre so that
they could recover their money by sale of the lot (Tr. 65-66, 216) .

-2-

Mr. Nipco subsequently ran into financial troubles and sold the
house and the front acre to Plaintiffs in July 1982 (Tr. 67, 151).
In April 1982, Defendants Ovard decided to list the back acre
for sale with Alan Whipple, a realtor (Tr. 224) .

In September

1982, Plaintiffs noticed activity on the back acre and concluded
that it might be sold (Tr. 152). Plaintiffs feared that someone
would buy the lot, build on it, and obstruct Plaintiffs1 view from
and enjoyment of their property (Tr. 153). Plaintiffs did not want
anyone to build on the back acre (Tr. 119-120, 185), and contacted
their own realtor, Fred Hale, to discuss buying the adjoining back
lot in order to prevent someone from building on it (Tr. 153, 155) .
Mr. Hale and Plaintiffs then prepared an offer of purchase, and Mr.
Hale then presented the offer to Defendants (Tr. 120).
On September 18, 1982, Plaintiffs and Defendants entered into
an Earnest Money Agreement pursuant to which Defendants agreed to
sell and Plaintiffs agreed to purchase the back acre for $26,000
(R. 201). On November 8, 1982, Plaintiffs delivered and Defendants
received and recorded a Trust Deed Note (hereinafter "Note") in the
amount of $25,900, with interest only at 15% per annum payable on
January

15,

1984,

and

$25,900

principal,

plus

then

accrued

interest, payable on November 15, 1985 (R. 201).
Prior to closing of the sale between Plaintiffs and Defendants, Plaintiffs did not request and Defendants did not offer
information concerning a variance on the property or the validity
of the subdivision map

(R. 202).

Subsequent to the closing,

Plaintiffs learned that the back lot would require a variance,
-3-

similar to the variance previously granted to Defendants, before
the City of Draper would issue a building permit on the back lot
(Tr, 168).
Plaintiffs' only payment to Defendants under the Note has been
an interest payment of $5000 made on March 1, 1984 (R. 202) .
Plaintiffs did not make the balloon payment that was due on January
15, 1985, and stated that they would not pay it (R. 202, Tr, 213).
Defendants then attempted a non-judicial trust deed foreclosure,
which was enjoined by Plaintiffs (R. 203).
Plaintiffs filed this fraud action in Third District Court
and Defendants counterclaimed to foreclose the Trust Deed.

The

matter was tried on October 26 and 27, 1987 before the Honorable
Frank G. Noel.

During the course of the trial, Plaintiffs moved

to amend their pleadings to conform to what they claimed was
evidence of mutual mistake of fact (Tr. 200), which was a claim and
issue not contained in Plaintiffs' Complaint (R. 2-18).

The Court

reserved ruling on this motion (Tr. 204). Plaintiffs did not renew
this motion during the remainder of or at the end of trial.
At the close of trial, the trial Judge asked if either party
objected if he went and viewed the property.

Both counsel for

Plaintiffs and counsel for the Defendants stated they had no
objection (Tr. 264). Judge Noel then took the matter under advisement (Tr. 264).
On December 4, 1987, the court issued a memorandum opinion,
finding in favor of Defendants on their counterclaim, and finding
no cause of action on Plaintiffs' claim (R. 142-43).
-4-

Plaintiffs

thereafter filed a Motion for New Trial and to Amend the Pleadings
to Conform to the Evidence, this time to assert claims of illegality and unilateral mistake

(R. 216-217, 227-229).

These

motions were denied (R. 256), and Plaintiffs appealed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

The granting of leave to amend the pleadings under Rule

15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is within the broad
discretion of the court, and should not be disturbed absent a
showing of abuse of discretion.

Further, Plaintiffs did not

sufficiently

of

plead

the

defenses

illegality

or

mistake.

Therefore, the trial court's decision to deny Plaintiff's Motion
to Amend the Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence should be upheld.
II.
they

A trial court's findings should not be disturbed unless

are so lacking

in support

as to be clearly erroneous.

Plaintiffs have not met their burden to marshal the evidence or to
construe

it

in a

light most

favorable

to

the trial

court.

Therefore, the trial court's finding of an absence of fraud or
negligent misrepresentation should not be disturbed.
III.

The trial judge's viewing of the property in dispute

was proper. Plaintiffs' allegation that the trial judge improperly
used information gathered at the viewing is without foundation.
The parties agreed to the viewing without condition.
court explicitly

stated that

importance to its decision.

Further, the

its viewing was not of primary
Finally, the judge's statements in

regard to the viewing were based on facts in evidence, and are

-5-

further supported by evidentiary affidavits submitted in opposition
to Plaintiffs1 post judgment motion to amend their pleadings.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO DENY PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
AMEND THE PLEADINGS TO CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE SHOULD NOT
BE DISTURBED.

When issues not formally raised in the pleadings are tried by
the express or implied consent of the parties, Rule 15(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter "Rule 15(b)") allows the
amendment of the pleadings.

That the issue has been tried by the

consent of the parties must be evident from the record.

Colman v.

Colman, 743 P.2d 782 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citations omitted).
Further, it must "appear that the parties understood the evidence
was to be aimed at the unpleaded issue."
a.

Id. at 785.

The trial court's decision to deny Plaintiffs' motion
was within the sound discretion of the court.

This court has stated that there is a mandatory requirement
to allow a party to amend its pleadings to conform to the evidence
when issues are tried by the express or implied consent of the
parties.

Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing, Ltd., 753

P.2d 507, 509 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

However, the question of

whether the issues have been sufficiently tried, and thus the
ultimate decision as to whether the amendment should be allowed,
remains in the sound discretion of the court. Stratford v. Morgan,
689 P.2d 360 (Utah 1984); Westley v. Farmer's Insurance Exchange,
663 P.2d 93 (Utah 1983).

Implied consent to try an issue may be

found where there is no objection to introduction of supporting
-6-

evidence by an opposing party and where it appears that the
opposing party understood that such evidence was aimed at an
unpleaded issue.

In any event, the opposing party must have had

a fair opportunity to defend and introduce evidence.

See Colman,

supra at 785.
In the present case, Plaintiffs have not shown that the denial
of the Rule 15(b) motion was a clear abuse of discretion.

To do

so, Plaintiffs have to show that they sufficiently tried the issues
of illegality and mistake. Plaintiffs cite Colman, supra, to show
that they have done so.

However, the issue in Colman. that of

alter ego, was "fully tried," and evidence concerning
element" was introduced without objection.

"every

Colman. supra at 785.

Any claimed evidence of illegality or unilateral mistake
introduced by Plaintiffs in the instant case would also support
Plaintiffs' claim of fraud. Plaintiffs' counsel even acknowledged
and argued such fact with respect to mistake (Tr. 241-243).
The mere introduction of claimed evidence of mistake did not
therefore place Defendants on notice that it was aimed at unpleaded
issues of mistake as is required by Colman. supra.

The motion of

Plaintiffs' counsel at trial (Tr. 200-204) to amend their pleadings
to assert mistake was the first act that could be argued to have
placed Defendants on notice that Plaintiffs were asserting or
relying on a claim of mistake. Defendants immediately objected to
such motion (Tr. 200).
Any

introduction

by

Plaintiffs

of

claimed

evidence

of

illegality likewise supported Plaintiffs' claims of fraud and did
-7-

not place Defendants on notice that such evidence was aimed at a
claim of illegality.

Plaintiffs did not move to amend their

pleadings to assert illegality during trial when such a motion was
made as to mistake (Tr. 200-204) , but such motion was made after
trial and after judgment had been entered (R. 210-214, 216-217).
Because Defendants were without notice that Plaintiffs were
introducing evidence aimed at mistake and illegality at the time
claimed evidence of such theories and issues was introduced, any
alleged trial of such issues was not with actual or implied consent
of Defendants and was inadvertent.
have fair opportunity to defend.

Defendants did not therefore
This was so, especially with

respect to the motion on illegality which was not made until after
trial and after formal judgment was entered.

Plaintiffs have

therefore not satisfied the Colman case upon which they rely.
Finally, as demonstrated in the next subsections, Plaintiffs
have not sufficiently established

and proven the elements of

illegality and mistake and for that reason should not have been
allowed to amend their pleadings.
b.

Plaintiffs did not sufficiently try and introduce evidence
of illegality.

Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that
a party must set forth the affirmative defense of illegality.

To

avoid a contractual obligation by claiming illegality, an appellant
must show clearly and unequivocally that the contract is illegal.
Mitchell v. American Savings and Loan Association, 593 P.2d 692,
694 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979).
-8-

Plaintiffs have not and cannot plead the defense of illegality
because they have misconstrued its application.

The illegality

defense applies to contracts which are themselves prohibited by law
or contrary to public policy. See Williams v. Continental Life and
Accident Co. , 593 P.2d 708 (Idaho 1979); Greer v. Northwestern
National Insurance Co. . 674 P.2d 1257

(Wash. Ct. App. 1984).

Plaintiffs do not allege that the contract between the parties is
itself prohibited by law or contrary to public policy, and in fact,
there

is no

statute

that

prohibits

this

contract.

Rather,

Plaintiffs argue that if Defendants illegally divided the property
into two one-acre parcels, then a contract purporting to sell one
of the divided acres should not be enforced.

Even if this concept

embraced the defense of illegality, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently tried the defense.
In their brief, Plaintiffs point to certain sections of the
Trial Transcript to support their argument that illegality was
sufficiently raised at trial (Brief of Appellants, 6-9). However,
there is nothing in Plaintiffs' brief or the record which state
that Defendants' actions were illegal.

In the first part of their

brief, Plaintiffs merely allege that Defendants' division of the
land is subject to land use regulations.

(Brief of Appellants, 6-

7; Tr. 17, 19 & 23) At the second part of their brief, Plaintiffs
point to another part of the transcript where they allegedly argued
illegality.

(Brief of Appellants, 8-9; Tr. 175, 178-79) However,

these sections of the Trial Transcript are arguments of counsel
during an objection at trial. They are not evidence and cannot be
-9-

considered in determining whether Plaintiffs tried and put on
evidence of illegality.
Plaintiffs also cite Utah statutes for the proposition that
Defendants acted illegally.

Nevertheless, the applicability of

these statutes was not raised at trial. Defendants1 basic premise
of illegality, i.e., the illegal division of land, is unfounded,
as the record clearly shows that Defendants1 predecessor owner had
already divided the land into two one-acre parcels when Defendants
initially purchased the land (Tr. 58, 222; Ex. 12-D and 13-D) .
The defense of illegality does not apply to this case.

Even

if this court finds that it does, Plaintiffs did not sufficiently
introduce evidence of it at trial.
c.

Plaintiffs did not sufficiently try and introduce evidence
of mistake.

Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that
"all averments of ... mistake shall be stated with particularity."
The nature of mistake ultimately relied upon by Plaintiffs is
unilateral mistake (R. 227-229), and their brief focuses only on
the mistake of Plaintiff Joseph Sanders.

The Utah Supreme Court

has stated the elements that must be established under unilateral
mistake:
(1) The mistake must be of so grave a consequence that
to enforce the contract as actually made would be
unconscionable.
(2) The matter as to which mistake was made must relate
to a material feature of the contract.
(3) Generally the mistake must have occurred notwithstanding the exercise of ordinary diligence by the party
making the mistake.
-10-

(4) It must be possible to give relief ... without
serious prejudice to the other party except the loss of
his bargain. In other words, it must put him in statu
[sic] quo.
Briaas v. Liddell. 699 P.2d
omitted).

770, 773

(Utah 1985)

(citations

Using the same analysis as the Briaas court, even if Plaintiffs1 evidence is viewed favorably to them, it is still deficient
as to at least one element, i.e., the exercise of ordinary diligence.

Id.

The trial court concluded that "Plaintiffs failed to

exercise due diligence at the time of purchase to determine the
status of the Property," and that "under the totality of the
circumstances, a reasonable person should have been alerted that
there may be access problems ... that should have been investigated." (R. 205-06).

Therefore, Plaintiffs have not met their

evidentiary burden of showing ordinary diligence on their part.
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION THAT THERE WAS NO FRAUD OR
NEGLIGENT REPRESENTATION BY DEFENDANTS SHOULD NOT BE
DISTURBED.
Plaintiffs complain that the trial court did not find that
false or negligent

representations

or opinions were made by

Defendants to Plaintiffs and that Plaintiffs reasonably relied upon
such representations (Appellants' Brief 11-17).

Plaintiffs claim

these representations or omissions concerned a zoning variance
under which Plaintiffs' house was built and whether the back acre
purchased by Plaintiffs from Defendants was part of an approved
subdivision and therefore a lot upon which a house could be built.
It is noted that although the Plaintiffs' house was built by
-11-

Defendant Sam Ovard, the house was not purchased by Plaintiffs from
any of Defendants but from an interim owner named Nipco (Tr. 6667) .

The trial court did not find the evidence as Plaintiffs

wanted.

The court, inter alia, found Plaintiffs had in their

possession a copy of a subdivision map (Exhibit 15-R) showing the
property in question as a lot in a subdivision (R. 202) . Such map
was not obtained from Defendants but was obtained from county
records by the real estate agent engaged by Plaintiffs to assist
them (Tr. 113-115).

The trial court further found that Defendants

did not represent to Plaintiffs anything concerning whether such
map was approved or not approved, whether Plaintiffs1 house was or
was not built pursuant to a zoning variance and that Plaintiffs did
not request or ask for any such information (R. 202). The trial
court then concluded (and as a prerequisite must have found) that
any statements or omissions relied upon by Plaintiffs were not
fraudulent or negligent and that even if they were, Plaintiffs
reliance on them was not justifiable (R. 205). The court further
concluded, because of visible conditions of the property purchased
by Plaintiffs, they should have been alerted that access problems
may have existed (R. 205-206).

Lack of access to a public street

is what precluded the ability to build a house on the property
without a zoning variance (Tr. 17-19).
Plaintiffs quarrel with the trial courts findings and lack of
findings and therefore its conclusions of law and decision.

In

doing so, however, Plaintiffs have only reargued their version of

-12-

the facts and that their legal interpretation thereof should have
been accepted by the trial court.

More is required.

Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter
"Rule 52(a)") states: "In all actions tried upon the facts without
a jury ... findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous...."
(emphasis supplied)

Plaintiffs have not shown that the trial

court's findings of fact or lack thereof were clearly erroneous.
Thus its findings should not be disturbed.
a.

Plaintiffs have not marshalled the evidence, but rather
have recited only those facts that favor their side.

The Utah Supreme Court most recently addressed Rule 52(a) in
In re Estate of Bartell. 105 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (March 28, 1989).
In Bartell. a widowed spouse appealed from a finding that she was
not an "omitted spouse under her deceased husband's will".

The

court stated that under Rule 52(a), even when appealing a judge's
findings of fact as opposed to a jury's findings, an "appellant
must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings
are so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear weight of the
evidence,' thus making them

'clearly erroneous.'"

Id. at 4

(quoting State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)).
As in Bartell. Plaintiffs in this case have
not even attempted to marshal the evidence in support of
the trial court's findings, nor [have they] attempted to
demonstrate that the trial court's findings are against
the clear weight of the evidence, as required by Walker.
Instead, [they] have essentially reargued the factual
case submitted below, construing all evidence in a light
-13-

most favorable to [their] case and largely ignoring the
evidence supportive of the trial court's findings.
Id.
Plaintiffs1 evidentiary burden for fraud is proof by clear and
convincing evidence.
1986).

Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790, 794 (Utah

Not only have Plaintiffs failed to meet which burden, they

did not marshal the evidence in an attempt to do so. As a result,
this court must "rely heavily on the presumption of correctness
that attends [the trial court's] findings,'1 and affirm its judgment.

Bartell. supra at 4.

A reviewing court does not sit to

retry cases submitted on disputed facts.

Id.

Because Plaintiffs did not attempt to marshal the facts in
support of the trial court's findings and show them to be clearly
erroneous, Defendants, though not required to do so, have marshaled
and set forth below certain of the evidence which supports the
trial court's failure to find that Defendants made intentional
fraudulent or negligent representations or omissions as to the
zoning variance and buildable status of the property or that, in
any event, Plaintiffs had relied thereon. Review of such evidence
clearly shows that it supports the trial court's position on how
it found and did not find the facts and that the court's position
is not against the clear weight of the evidence.
1. Defendants predecessor owner (Mr. Newman) had a map (Exh.
15-P) which showed a division of 5 lots including the one purchased
by Plaintiffs from Defendants.

Mr. Newman gave Sam Ovard a copy

of this map (Tr. 58).
-14-

2.

Fred Hale (Plaintiffs1 realtor who Plaintiffs asked to

prepare with them an offer to purchase from Defendants (Tr. 112,
117, 153) obtained Exh. 15-P not from Defendants or Mr. Whipple
(the listing real estate agent) but from the County Recorders
office (Tr. 113-115) .
3.

Mr. Hale provided Exh. 15-P to Plaintiffs (Tr. 113-114,

154, 183).
4.

Exh. 15-P was not an approved subdivision map (Tr. 76).

5.

Defendants did not tell Plaintiffs that Exh. 15-P was a

subdivision map (Tr. 183-184).
6. Plaintiffs did not claim Exh. 15-P to be a subdivision map
but regarded it only as a boundary survey (Tr. 183-184), and Mr.
Sanders was familiar with boundary line surveys because of his
experience with them (Tr. 182).
7.

Description of property on Exh. 10-P (listing card) as a

private lane to tree line seclusion did not mean that someone could
have a residence down the lane (Tr. 86).
8. Mr. Whipple never talked to Plaintiffs about the property
(Tr. 91-92) . He did talk to Mr. Hale, but he never told Plaintiffs
or Mr. Hale that the lot was a buildable lot (Tr. 93).
9.

Regardless of zoning, one cannot be sure in Draper City

that property can be built on until you check with the City (Tr.
83-84).
10.

Draper City will give one opinion one time and another

opinion another time with respect to improvements on property (Tr.
94) .
-15-

11.

Mr. Whipple advertised the property for sale but never

as a buildcible lot (Tr. 98) .
12. Mr. Whipple was never made aware in his dealings with Mr.
Hale that Plaintiffs intended to build on the lot, if in fact they
did (Tr. 99).
13.

Although Sam Ovard knew a zoning variance would be

required to build on the property (Tr. 214, 217, 220) he believed
before and after the sale that a purchaser or Plaintiffs could
obtain a variance or could get a building permit to build on the
property

(Tr. 71, 220) .

He did not have any purpose in not

disclosing such facts to Plaintiffs (Tr. 214). He was not aware
that Plaintiffs, as they now claim, would not have purchased the
property if they had known they could not build upon it without a
variance (Tr. 215).
14.

Sam Ovard did not know the lane to the property did not

meet access requirements for a variance (Tr. 217).
15.

A closing statement signed by Plaintiffs designated the

lot as "undeveloped" (Tr. 197-198), and Plaintiffs made no inquiry
as to whether the lot could be developed (Tr. 198-200).
16.

Plaintiffs do not know that they cannot get a building

permit for the property and have never applied for one (Tr. 175).
17.

Under prior land use regulations, variances were granted

by Draper City for building on three other lots on the lane leading
to the lot in question, and under current regulations, such variances have been granted on other lots in Draper City (Tr. 22-24) .
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18.

Plaintiffs1 purpose for purchasing the property was not

to build on it themselves, but they were concerned someone else
would purchase and build on it (Tr. 112-113, 119).
19.

Plaintiffs did not want anyone else to build on the

property (Tr. 119, 155, 185).
20.

Plaintiffs did not purchase the property to build on it

but purchased it in order to join it as a vacant lot with their
adjacent house and to have more of an estate (Tr. 120), and horse
property was of interest to Plaintiffs (Tr. 121).
21.

Plaintiffs were going to put a white picket fence around

the property as a place for a horse and build a "lean to" on it
(Tr. 121-122).
22.

Plaintiffs advised Mr. Hale they were going to use the

property for horse pasture (Tr. 196).
23. Plaintiffs never told Mr. Hale, before or after the sale,
that they intended to build a home on the property (Tr. 122).
24. Plaintiffs only expressed concern about being overpriced
for the neighborhood by joining the vacant lot and their house
together (Tr. 123-124).
25.

Mr. Hale assisted Plaintiffs in arriving at a value to

be paid for the property (Tr. 115) , and they studied other properties to determine that joinder of the vacant lot and the house
would not over price them for the neighborhood (Tr. 124-125, 186) .
26.

Neither Defendants nor Mr. Whipple had anything to do

with Plaintiffs1 conclusion they could get their money out of the
house and lot joined together (Tr. 186).
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27.

It was Mr. Halefs normal practice to explain the purpose

that a buyer client has for purchasing property, but he does not
recall disclosing to Defendants that Plaintiffs were concerned that
someone else would build on the property.

He only disclosed that

Plaintiffs wanted to purchase the property for horse pasture (Tr.
129-130).
28.

Plaintiffs relied on the fact that two other homes were

being built to the right and left of their house for their conclusion that the property was a buildable lot.
were owned by persons other than Defendants.

Such other houses
Defendants had

nothing to do with the building of such other houses, and Plaintiffs did not rely on Defendants for Plaintiffs1 conclusion based
on such other houses (Tr. 191-192).
29.

Plaintiffs did not recall even Mr. Hale telling them the

property was a buildable lot (Tr. 195-196).
30.

In addition to Defendants Sam Ovard, Defendants Ben

Ovard, Helen Ovard and Reva Ovard did not have conversations with
Plaintiffs, they did not represent that the property could be built
upon, they were not aware that Plaintiffs believed the property was
a buildable lot or that Plaintiffs would not have purchased the
property if they had known the property was not buildable (Tr. 229231, 237-238).
b.

Lack of reasonable investigation.

Plaintiffs introduced no evidence that they performed any
investigation to confirm their conclusion that the property was a
buildable lot. Reasonable investigation on their part is required
-18-

under the circumstances in order to support reasonable reliance by
Plaintiffs1.
In Lewis v. White, 269 P.2d 865 (Utah 1954) , the Supreme Court
considered the issue of fraud in the sale and purchase of a motel.
The buyers contended that the sellers had made false representations as to insulation, sewage disposal, and income generated by
the motel.

The court said, "No matter how naive or inexperienced

the [buyers] were, they could not close their eyes and accept
unquestioningly any representations made to them.

It was their

duty to make such investigation and inquiry as reasonable care
under the circumstances would dictate."

Id. at

866.

In Pace v. Parrish, 247 P.2d 273 (Utah 1952), plaintiffs
brought an action for fraud in connection with sale of farm land
to them. The basis for the claim was that part of the land was not
of the same quality as the rest of the land, as had been represented.

The defective land had not been cultivated or broken up

and was obviously rocky.

The Supreme Court held as a matter of

law that the plaintiffs had not used reasonable care and diligence.
The condition of the land had placed them on inquiry notice of its
condition, and the most casual of inspections, stated the court,
would have shown it was not good for cultivation.

The court so

ruled notwithstanding that when walking the property one of the
plaintiffs had stated that he would break up the uncultivated land,
and the defendant seller had thought "maybe you will and maybe you
wonft," but said nothing.

Id. at 275.
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There was no fiduciary obligation in this case between the
Defendants as sellers and the Plaintiffs as buyers.

See Secor,

supra at 795 (quoting Duaan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Utah
1980)) . The trial court in this case found that, regardless of the
relationship of the parties, Defendants did not make fraudulent or
negligent misrepresentations and, even if they did, Plaintiffs
could not reasonably rely on the misrepresentations because they
had failed to exercise due diligence in determining the true status
of the property (R. 205). Specifically, the trial court found that
due to the location and appearance of the property and the road
leading to and from the property, a reasonable person would have
inquired as to access problems (R. 205-206).

Because of these

circumstances, and because the Plaintiffs have failed to marshal
the evidence or show clear abuse by the lower court, its judgment
should not be disturbed.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT'S VIEWING OF THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE WAS
PROPER.

Plaintiffs contend that the trial judge erred in viewing the
property in dispute because, in doing so, he relied on extrinsic
evidence gathered at the viewing to find in favor of Defendants.
Plaintiffs1 contention is based on conjecture and speculation and
is without merit, as they have read misguided and unsupported
interpretations into the trial judge's conclusions of law.
A decision by the court to view the property in a dispute
rests within the sound discretion of the court.
Corp., 381 A.2d 559 (Conn. 1977).
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O'Connor v. Dorv

The purpose of such a viewing

"is to assist in interpreting and resolving differences in evidence," rather than to supply evidence totally lacking.

Weber

Basin Water Conservancy District v. Moore, 272 P.2d 176, 177 (Utah
1954).

At trial in this case conflicting evidence was presented

as to whether a cul-de-sac existed at the time Plaintiffs purchased
the property in dispute (Tr. 62, 172).

Plaintiffs allege that

there was no cul-de-sac at that time, and that the conditions of
the property have changed dramatically since that time, thereby
misleading the trial judge at his viewing. However, the Affidavits
of neighboring residents submitted by Defendants state that the
area is virtually identical now to what it was at the time Plaintiffs purchased the property (R. 238-39, 242-44). The only changes
have been the installation of a cement gutter around the cul-desac, not to define the cul-de-sac but to control water run-off; the
planting of shrubs and plants on private property near the cul-desac; and the installation of a cement wall on the front of private
property which adjoins the cul-de-sac (R. 239, 243-44).

None of

these changes have caused the property to change dramatically in
appearance.
After viewing the property at the conclusion of the trial, the
trial court stated in its Memorandum Opinion that:
after having viewed the property, that due to the
location of the property, the road leading from the main
paved road ending in what appears to be somewhat of a
cal-de-sac [sic], and under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person should have been alerted
that there may be access problems associated with the
back parcel that should be investigated.
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(R. 142-43, 205-06).

Plaintiffs have not shown that any of these

factors considered by the trial judge did not exist at the time
they purchased the property in question.
The Colorado Court of Appeals has dealt with this issue in a
similar case.

In Thomas v. National State Bank, 628 P.2d 188

(Colo. Ct. App. 1981), there was a dispute as to whether a house
had been negligently constructed.

Defendants contended that the

trial court had erred in allegedly basing one of its findings in
part on its viewing of the premises. The trial court had announced
at the end of trial that it wished to view the property and
received no objection from counsel.

In finding for the plaintiff,

the trial court stated, "This [the finding for the Plaintiff] is
apparent both from the topographical map [introduced into evidence
by defendants] and from a view of the premises which the court made
...."

Xd. at 190 (quoting trial court).

The court of appeals

stated that under these circumstances, defendants1 argument was
without merit.

Id. (citations omitted).

Defendants are merely speculating when they allege that the
trial court relied heavily on his viewing. The trial court in fact
dispelled that notion in its Order Denying Motions for New Trial
and to Amend the Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence, when it
stated that its viewing of the property in question was not of
primary importance to its decision (R. 255-256).

Even if it did

put some reliance on the viewing, its reliance was proper, as it
was only to assist in resolving differences in the evidence already
presented.
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Finally, the trial court's viewing of the property was agreed
to by both Plaintiffs and Defendants

(Tr. 264) .

After such

agreement and failure to object to the viewing prior to its
occurrence and after being given the opportunity by the trial court
to object, Plaintiffs1 later objection is precluded and without
merit.
IV.

ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

The promissory note sued upon by Defendants provides for
attorney's fees to Defendants upon default by Plaintiffs in payment
of the same (Exh. 2-P) .

Defendants should therefore be awarded

attorney's fees and costs on this appeal, with the amount thereof
to be determined by the trial court upon remand for that purpose.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's judgment should be affirmed
reasons.

for three

First, the trial court's refusal to allow Plaintiffs to

amend their pleadings to conform to the evidence was within the
court's discretion, as Plaintiffs did not sufficiently try illegality or mistake.

Second, the trial court's finding for

Defendants on the question of fraud was within the court's discretion and was not clearly erroneous, and Plaintiffs have failed to
marshal the evidence to show otherwise and that they conducted
reasonable investigation on their own. Finally, the trial court's
viewing of the property in dispute was proper, and its subsequent
decision was based on evidence in the record.

Defendants should

be awarded attorney's fees and costs on appeal and this matter
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should be remanded to the trial court to determine the amount
thereof.
DATED May 15, 1989.
Respectfully Submitted,
PARSONS & CROWTHER

N. Crowther
Attorneys for Appellees

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Four copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellees were served
upon Plaintiffs by causing a copy of the same to be mailed, postage
prepaid, to Plaintiffs' attorney, Frederick N. Green, at 528
Newhouse Building, 10 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
this 15th day of May, 1989.
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Thomas N. Crowther
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